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PARTIES
The Plaintiffs in the action below are Rodaric Group, LLC, Action Investment
Services, LLC, Lee Jackson and Richard Jackson. The Defendants below are Frank J.
Gillen, W. Kelly Ryan, Shauna Badger, Michael W. Devine, Gregory Haerr, Michael
Vanderhoof, Kevin Dortery, and Jonathan Moore. Only Defendant W. Kelly Ryan
appeals the trial court's decision. Accordingly, W. Kelly Ryan (hereinafter "Ryan") is
listed as the sole appellant, with Plaintiffs being listed as the Appellees.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-2(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether a trial court commits reversible error when it enters a default

judgment against a defendant for failure to appear where the defendant appears at trial
through counsel, and where the trial court never instructed or ordered that the defendant
could not appear via counsel.
Preservation of Issue: R. 2922.
Standard of Review: Correctness. A trial court's application of the rules of
procedure presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, with no deference
to the trial court's decision. Drew v. Lee, 250 P.3d 48, 50 (Utah 2011).
2.

Whether a trial court commits reversible error when it does not apply the

doctrine of res judicata, but allows a party to pursue claims the party previously raised in
a bankruptcy action where the bankruptcy court has already entered a final order
regarding such bankruptcy.
Preservation of Issue: R. 2601-23; 2724-34.
Standard of Review: Correctness. Whether a party's claims are precluded by the
doctrine of res judicata presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Mack
v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 221 P.3d 194, 202 (Utah 2009).
3.

Whether a party may properly pursue an action for securities fraud against

directors or officers of a company without naming that company as a party in the action.
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Preservation of Issue: R. R. 2601-23; 2724-34.
Standard of Review: Correctness. The interpretation and application of a statute
presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Gen. Constr. & Dev., Inc. v.
Peterson Plumbing Supply, 248 P.3d 972, 973 (Utah 2011).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55(a):
Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as
provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter the default of that party.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16(d):
Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a
scheduling or pretrial order, if no appearance is made on behalf
of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a party or a
party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the
conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails to participate in
good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may take
any action authorized by Rule 37(b)(2).
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale,
or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-22(l)-(4):
(1) (a) This Subsection (1) applies to a person who:
2
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(i) offers or sells a security in violation of:
(A) Subsection 61-1-3(1);
(B) Section 61-1-7;
(C) Subsection 61-1-17(2);
(D) a rule or order under Section 61-1-15, which requires the
affirmative approval of sales literature before it is used; or
(E) a condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 61-111(7); or
(ii) offers, sells, or purchases a security in violation of
Subsection 61-1-1(2).
(b) A person described in Subsection (l)(a) is liable to a
person selling the security to or buying the security from the
person described in Subsection (l)(a). The person to whom the
person described in Subsection (l)(a) is liable may sue either at
law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security,
together with interest at 12% per year from the date of payment,
costs, and reasonable attorney fees, less the amount of income
received on the security, upon the tender of the security or for
damages if the person no longer owns the security.
(c) Damages are an amount calculated as follows:
(i) subtract from the amount that would be recoverable upon a
tender under Subsection (7)(b) the value of the security when the
buyer disposed of the security; and
(ii) add to the amount calculated under Subsection (l)(c)(i)
interest at:
(A) 12% per year:
(1) beginning the day on which the security is purchased by
the buyer; and
(II) ending on the date of disposition; and
(B) after the period described in Subsection (l)(c)(ii)(A), 12%
per year on the amount lost at disposition.
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection (1) may
award an amount equal to three times the consideration paid for
the security, together with interest, costs, and attorney fees, less
any amounts, all as specified in Subsection (1) upon a showing
that the violation was reckless or intentional.
(3) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of
Subsection 61-1-1(2) is not liable under Subsection (l)(a) if the
purchaser knew of the untruth or omission, or the seller did not
know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known of the untrue statement or misleading omission.
(4) (a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a
seller or buyer liable under Subsection (1), every partner, officer,
3
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or director of such a seller or buyer, every person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of
such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the sale or purchase,
and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale
or purchase are also liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless the nonseller or
nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that
the nonseller or nonpurchaser did not know, and in exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. The instant appeal concerns the propriety of a default
judgment entered by the court below after it refused to commence trial because the
Defendant, Ryan, was present via counsel but not in person. Ryan's counsel assured the
trial court that Ryan was ready to immediately proceed with trial, but the trial court
wanted Ryan's actual body to be in the courtroom before Plaintiffs presented their fourday case seeking recovery for securities fraud.
Prior to defaulting Ryan for appearing via counsel and not in person, the trial court
never ordered or otherwise instructed Ryan that he could not attend via counsel while
Plaintiffs presented their case. Accordingly, Ryan planned to appear via counsel while
Plaintiffs presented their case and then, due to limited finances as an out-of-state litigant
and the need for him to remain employed to support his family, he could attend the trial
in person the following week, when it was Ryan's turn to present his defenses.
Rather than let Plaintiffs begin to present their evidence and call their witnesses to
prove their case against Ryan, and rather than let Ryan's counsel then cross-examine such
witnesses; the trial court ignored Ryan's appearance via counsel and the representations
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that the trial could commence the trial without any further delay, and struck Ryan's
pleadings and entered a default judgment against Ryan.
Ryan appeals the default judgment entered by the trial court and respectfully
requests that this Court find that where a defendant appears at trial via counsel, ready to
proceed with trial, and where the trial court has not issued an order requiring personal
attendance, it is reversible error for the trial court to enter a default judgment against such
defendant.
Procedural History.
In June of 2007, the Investors initiated the lawsuit that is the subject of this appeal.
Notably, HomeNet Communications, Inc. and HomeNet Corporation (Faraday) are not
named parties in this lawsuit.
In a Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court determined that Defendants
probably could not be secondarily liable due to Plaintiffs' failure to name the Companies
as parties to the lawsuit. The trial court based this ruling on the plain language of Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-22(4).
At the final pretrial, Kelly Ryan, who resides in Washington was not able to
personally attend but attempted to appear telephonically. The trial court refused to allow
this appearance.
Trial was set in this case for August 2, 2010. Kelly Ryan appeared for trial on this
date personally. However, under motion by another defendant, the trial was postponed
and scheduled for eight days spread out over two weeks, beginning on November 8,
2010.
5
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On November 8, 2010, Kelly Ryan was unable to attend trial. However, he
planned to appear the second week of trial to give testimony. On the scheduled day of
trial, the Plaintiffs continued the proceeding one day to accommodate potential
settlement. All defendants except for Ryan were able to reach a settlement in this case. In
anticipation of his inability to reach a settlement with Plaintiffs, Ryan retained Nathan E.
Burdsal to act as his attorney and instructed him to proceed with trial. On the day of trail,
Nathan E. Burdsal made his appearance which was accepted over the Investors'
objection.
Despite Nathan E. Burdsal's assurance that he was ready for trial and prepared to
move forward, the Court struck Ryan's Answer and entered default against him holding
that he is secondarily liable for securities fraud based on the October loan. As a result, the
Investors were able to procure a judgment for approximately $1,250,000.00 against a
party that was represented and ready to go to trial.
Disposition at Trial Court. As discussed above, at trial, Ryan appeared via
counsel, ready to proceed with trial. However, despite accepting the appearance of
counsel in Ryan's behalf, the trial court proceeded to strike Ryan's pleadings and enter a
default judgment against Ryan for "failure to appear."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
General Background Information
1.

On June 26, 2007, Rodaric Group, LLC, Action Investment Services, LLC,

Lee Jackson, and Richard Jackson (hereinafter "Investors") filed a Complaint against
Frank J. Gillen, W. Kelly Ryan, Shauna Badger, Michael W. Devine, Gregory Haerr,
6
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Michael Vanderhoof, Kevin Dorty, and Jonathan Moore (collectively "Officers and
Directors"), the officers and directors of Faraday Financial, Inc. ("Faraday") and its
surviving entities and subsidiaries. (R. 1-18.)
2.

In their Complaint, Investors allege that they were induced to invest in

Faraday and its surviving entities and subsidiaries through fraudulent misstatements
constituting Securities Fraud under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22. (R. 1-18.)
3.

Only one set of the investments occurred while Kelly Ryan was an officer

or director of Faraday and its surviving entities and subsidiaries; an investment made in
October of 2004 (the "October Investment"). (R. 1-18.)
4.

At no time have the investors brought a suit against Faraday or its surviving

entities or subsidiaries for the securities fraud. (R. In toto.)
October Investment
5.

In August of 2004, HomeNet Utah, Inc. (a subsidiary of Faraday Financial)

entered into a merger agreement whereby HomeNet Utah, Inc. merged with VIB and
changed its name to HomeNet Communications, Inc. ("HomeNet Communications").
6.

In September of 2004, Faraday Financial changed its name to HomeNet

Corporation. (R. 1771.)
7.

In its Proxy, HomeNet Corporation states that HomeNet Communications

Inc. is a wholly owned operating subsidiary of HomeNet Corporation. (R. 1771.)
8.

As of October, 2004, Kelly Ryan ("Mr. Ryan") was the Chief Executive

Officer of HomeNet Corporation. (R. 1771.)
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9.

On October 13, 2004, Investors entered into Secured Loan Agreements

with HomeNet Corporation and HomeNet Communications. (R. 1770.)
10.

Pursuant to the Secured Loan Agreements, Investors agreed to provide

collectively $450,000.00. (R. 1770.)
11.

The Investors allege that these loans were funded by October 19, 2004. (R.

12.

The October loans were purported to be secured solely by the assets of

1770.)

HomeNet. (R. 1437-1458; 1460-1477; 1769.)
13.

On November 19, 2004, Investors signed a "Security Agreement" as an

ancillary to their October loans. The Security Agreement purports to be effective between
HomeNet Communications, Inc., Harrison Horn as collateral agent, and the Investors. (R.
1769.)
14.

The Security Agreement purports to "create a security interest in favor of

the Collateral Agent for the benefit of the [Investors]." (R.1769.)
15.

Although Harrison Horn never signed the Security Agreement, the

Investors never spoke or attempted to speak with Harrison Horn, and that the Security
Agreement was entered into more than a month after the Investors agreed to fund and
actually did fund the October Notes, the Investors purport that Harrison Horn's presence
as a Collateral Agent was integral to the Investors' decision to enter into the October
loans. (R. 1912-1913.)
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Actions Subsequent to the October Loans
16.

In December of 2004, Harrison Horn entered into a note with HomeNet

Corporation that was materially different to Investors' notes. (R. 1768.)
17.

Specifically, Harrison Horn requested that the Investors personally

guarantee the performance of his note and provide collateral for his note. (R. 2604.)
18.

HomeNet Corporation and HomeNet Communications, Inc. subsequently

defaulted on its obligations to Harrison Horn as well as its other debtors. (R. 2604.)
19.

In late 2005, HomeNet Communications, Inc. was forced into involuntary

bankruptcy in Washington State. (R. 361.)
20.

The Investors participated in that bankruptcy proceeding, but never initiated

an adversary proceeding against HomeNet Communications, Inc. (R. 361.)
21.

On April 21, 2008, the bankruptcy court entered a final order in the

bankruptcy action for HomeNet Communications, Inc. (R. 2680, 2703)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should overturn the default judgment entered by the trial court because
no rule of law or procedure allows a court to enter the default of a party in a civil action
where the party is present via counsel and ready to proceed with trial. Importantly, a trial
court is even more limited in its opportunity to grant a default judgment where the trial
court encourages a defendant to obtain counsel for trial, the defendant follows the trial
court's advice, but the trial court never advises the defendant that failure to appear in
person would result in default. Accordingly, the trial court's application of the rules of
procedure concerning default judgment was erroneous and reversible.
9
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Importantly, after reversing the trial court's default judgment, this Court need not
remand the matter to the trial court because the record presents this Court with sufficient
evidence to hold that, as a matter of law, Investors cannot recover against Ryan.
ARGUMEN 1

'

This Court should overturn the trial court's default judgment entered against Ryan
and order that the trial court enter judgment in Ryan's favor.
On November 9, 2010, Ryan appeared in Court via counsel, ready for trial and
eager to defend the allegations asserted against him. However, despite the appearance of
his counsel, the Court entered the Default Judgment "[b]ased upon the non-appearance of
Ryan." (See Default Judgment at p. 3.) Because the Court entered a default judgment for
hundreds of thousands of dollars against a party who had answered the initial complaint,
who appeared via counsel at trial for a civil matter, and who was read) to proceed with
trial without any delay, there was no basis in law or in fact upon which default judgment
could have been entered. Accordingly, the Default Judgment is improper and voidable.
See P&B Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(stating that,
"[t]he entry of a default judgment by a court with jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter, where there is no default in law or in fact, is regarded as improper or
illegal, and voidable.")
Finally, the Court need not remand the instant case back to the trial court for a trial
because, as a matter of law, Ryan has adequate defenses tl tat pi ecli ide ai i> recovery
against him in this action.

10
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I.

THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF
DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE (1) RYAN PROPERLY FILED
RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS, (2) RYAN DID APPEAR AT TRIAL VIA
COUNSEL, AND (3) RYAN'S APPEARANCE AT TRIAL VIA COUNSEL
DID NOT VIOLATE ANY COURT ORDER.
This Court should overturn the entry of default. Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure controls the entry of default judgment against a defendant in a civil action.
Pursuant to Rule 55, entry of default may only occur, "[w]hen a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as
provided by these rules." In the case at hand, Ryan did not fail to plead or otherwise
defend." In fact, Ryan actually filed pleadings with the trial court, he actually appeared at
trial via counsel, and was actually ready to proceed with trial. Thus, Ryan neither failed
to plead nor failed to otherwise defend against Investors' claims.
Accordingly, there is no basis, in fact or in law, for the Court's entry of the
Default Judgment and the Court should set aside the Default Judgment.
A. Default under Rule 55 is improper because Ryan did not fail to plead.
Under Rule 55, if a defendant in a civil action fails to plead, the Court may enter a
default against such party. Conversely, if a defendant has filed a responsive pleading such
as an answer, default may not be properly entered against such defendant. See Utah R.
Civ. Pro. 12.
In the instant matter, Ryan filed his Answer to the underlying Complaint on or
about August 20, 2007. (R. 59.) Furthermore, Ryan also filed a second Answer on
October 27, 2008, in response to Investors' Third Amended Complaint. (R. 1051.) As
stated in Rule 7, upon the filing of an answer, no further pleadings are allowed unless
11
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there is a counter-claim or third-party complaint. Thus, no further pleadings were
required of Ryan beyond the filing of the two separate Answers filed by Ryan in August
of 2007 and in October of 2008.
Accordingly, there is no basis, in law or in fact, for the entry of default pursuant to
a failure to plead.
B. Default under Rule 55 is improper because Ryan defended against
Investors' claims.
The second and final ground for entering a default under Rule 55 is when a party
has "otherwise failed to defend as provided by [the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]." At
the time the Court entered the default judgment, Ryan had not "failed to defend" against
Investors' claims.
Presumably, the Court entered the default against Ryan because he was not
personally present at trial. However, nowhere in the rules of procedure is a defendant in a
civil trial required to be personally present at trial. This is especially if the defendant is
represented by counsel at the trial and is ready to go to trial. Indeed, a corporation or
other business entity often appears at trial with only the attorney present. To require an
individual to appear, but allow other legal entities to proceed without appearing would be
to favor corporate entities and penalize individuals for being natural persons.
Furthermore, where an attorney appears in Court on behalf of a client, the attorney
is fully authorized to act as the client's agent such that the attorney's knowledge and
actions are imputed to the client. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993)(holding that, "an attorney is the agent of the client and knowledge of any

12
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material fact possessed by the attorney is imputed to the client.") Therefore, when Ryan's
attorney appeared at trial on November 9, 2011, the legal effect of such appearance was
that the attorney was Ryan's agent, and for all intensive purposes, given that the matter
was a civil trial, the trial court could proceed as if Ryan were there personally.
Importantly, where Investors adamantly represented to the trial court that they
needed at least four days, maybe even five, to present their case, Ryan reasonably
believed that he would not be able to present his defense until at least the fourth day of
trial, maybe even the fifth. (R. 2920 - 25:10-11.) Ryan then planned to appear via
counsel while Investors presented their case, only appearing in person when it was time
to present his defenses. (R. 2922 - 9:8-13.)
Accordingly, the Court improperly determined that Ryan's appearance via counsel
and being ready to proceed without any delay constituted a failure to defend under Rule
55 and default should not have been entered.
C. Default under Rule 16(d) is improper because the Court never entered a
scheduling or pre-trial order instructing Ryan that he must appear pro se
and that he could not have counsel appear on his behalf.
Beyond Rule 55, a trial court may, as a severe and harsh sanction, strike pleadings
and enter default pursuant to Rule 16(d), which rule authorizes the sanctions set forth in
Rule 37(b)(2) for failure to abide by a scheduling or pretrial order of the trial court. Rule
16(d) specifically states that:
If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or
pretrial order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a
scheduling or pretrial conference, if a party or a party's attorney
is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a
party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the
13
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court, upon motion or its own initiative, may take any action
authorized by Rule 37(b)(2).
Investors cannot point to any order of the trial court promulgated under Rule 16
that instructed Ryan that he was required to appear pro se and could not appear via
counsel. (See R. 1-2922.) The Court never ordered Ryan to refrain from hiring counsel
and never ordered him to appear personally instead of via counsel. In fact, the trail court
strongly encouraged Ryan to obtain counsel for trial. (R. 2922 - 5:24-25; 6:1.) Ryan
appeared via counsel, as was his right and as encouraged by the trial court, and as is
acceptable under the plain language of Rule 16(d).
The only possible support in the record for a determination that Ryan was ordered
to appear in person and that Ryan was warned of the risk of default for failure to appear
in person is a reference in the trial court's docket concerning the hearing on November 9,
2010. In the court's docket for November 9, 2010, there is a statement saying that, "Mr.
Ryan was informed he needed to be at the bench trial, if he failed to appear, judgment
would be entered against him." However, this statement is insufficient to support the
entry of a default judgment under Rule 16(d).
First, assuming that the statement is accurate, the statement merely instructed
Ryan to appear, which Ryan did, via counsel. The statement does not inform Ryan he
cannot hire an attorney and have that attorney represent him and act in his behalf.
Second, while the statement is present in the court docket, the statement is not found
anywhere in the official transcript of the hearing held on November 9, 2010. (R. 2922.)
Third, the remainder of the court record is completely devoid of any written order
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instructing Ryan to appear in person for trial and not via an attorney. Importantly, the
trial court refused to let Ryan appear at the pre-trial conference via telephone1, so there is
no way the trial court could have issued an order to Ryan orally during such pre-trial
conference.
Finally, Rule 16(d) cannot apply to the instant matter because the trial court never
referenced or cited to Rule 16(d) as a basis for entering the default judgment. (R. 277173.) The default judgment entered by the court merely states that the default judgment
was entered for a failure to appear, not as a sanction for disobeying an order of the trial
court under Rule 16. (R. 2771 -73.)
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court committed reversible error when it
entered a default judgment against Ryan after Ryan appeared at trial via counsel,
especially where the trial court never instructed Ryan that he could not appear via
counsel.
II.

AFTER OVERTURNING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, THE COURT
NEED NOT REMAND THE INSTANT MATTER BECAUSE, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, INVESTORS ARE PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING AGAINST RYAN.
A. As a matter of law, Investors cannot recover against Ryan because
Investors failed to name the company as a party to the underlying action.
Initially, Investors cannot establish that Ryan is secondarily liable for any of the

loans because, even if everything that Investors allege is true, Investors have elected to
1

The trial court refused to allow Ryan to appear telephonically even though Ryan resides
out-of-state and even though such telephonic appearance is authorized by rule. See Rule
16(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that, "[t]he attorneys and unrepresented
parties shall appear at the scheduling and management conference in person or by remote
electronic means."
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not sue the parties who are primarily responsible. As such, Investors are precluded from
ever recovering against Ryan for Investors' involvement in HomeNet.
In asserting their claims, Investors asked the trial court to order that with regards
to statutory violations of securities fraud by HomeNet, "such [security] violations have
been shown." In essence, Investors asked the trial court, and the trial court acquiesced, to
enter an order that some non-party that is beyond the trial court's jurisdiction and that has
not had the opportunity to defend itself committed securities fraud. This is an improper
and unjustified application of the law.
The statute under which Investors filed their suit establishes that an officer or
director is secondarily liable for the actions of a company only if the company is first
held liable. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). However, Investors have not obtained any
court order finding liability against any company in which Ryan was involved. Investors
have never alleged that they have any sort of privity with Ryan. (See Third Amended
Complaint.) Further, Investors cannot prove privity because they have not sued the
primary responsible parties. (See Third Amended Complaint.)
In the court below, Investors claimed that Steenblick v. Lichtfield, 906 P.2d 872
(Utah 1995), justified their claims that the trial court could properly hold Ryan
secondarily liable for securities fraud without even naming the underlying company in
the same lawsuit. However, Investors' reliance on Steenblick is without merit. Steenblick
does not stand for

proposition that an officer or director is secoiidaiily liable for the

actions of a company even if the company is not named or held liable for the fraud. In
Steenblick, the underlying Corporation for which the officer worked was held liable for
16
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Securities Fraud by the district court. Thus, where Steenblick went up on appeal, it is
logical that where the company was named and found liable below, the Utah Supreme
Court simply concluded that "a partner, an officer, a director, a person of similar status or
function, or a seller of securities is liable for violations committed by the entity unless
that person proves the affirmative defense that he lacked knowledge of the unlawful
acts." Id. at 876 (emphasis added). The Steenblick Court did not say that an officer or
director is liable for presumptive violations committed by a corporation where no lawful
court has ever established such liability. Id. In fact, no court has made such a ruling.
Courts in Connecticut have also concluded that liability under a primary violation
is required to maintain a secondary suit in a securities fraud statute similar to Utah's.
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101, 120 (Conn. 1997). Furthermore, Utah courts
generally dismiss secondary causes of action when the primary cause of action cannot be
established. See also, Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
Without naming, suing, and obtaining a judgment against the underlying
companies, no judgment may be obtained against any officer or director of those
companies. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). To hold otherwise would be a violation of both
State and Federal Constitutional Due Process Rights. (US Const. Amend. 14; Utah Const.
Art I § 7.) Additionally, this Court would lack the jurisdiction to find that persons who
are not before the court have engaged in illegal behavior. "For a court to acquire
jurisdiction, there must be a proper issuance and service of summons." Jackson Constr.
Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, Tj 10, 100 P.3d 1211. "Service of process implements the
procedural due process requirement that a defendant be informed of pending legal action
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and be provided with an opportunity to defend against the action." Carlson v. Bos, 740
P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 1987). Additionally, such a conclusion would be contrary to the
express language of the Utah statute that provides that an individual secondarily liable is
limited and expressly tied to the liability of the primary violator; this provision of Utah
law does not create an independent action against an officer or director of a company.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) ("every, partner, officer, or director of a seller or buyer . . .
are also liable jointly and severally with and to the sail ic extent as the seller or
purchaser.") (emphasis added). By not naming the Companies, no other party can carry
secondary liability because no party carries primary liability.
Ryan can only be secondarily liable if the companies are liable. The only way the
companies can be liable is if they are sued in open court, given the opportunity to defend
themselves, to object to the discovery of attorney-client privileged information, and be
given the opportunity to bring and assert off-sets, counterclaims, cross-claims, and other
defenses. None of these due process protections are available in this case.
B. As a matter of law, the
recovering from Ryan.
"The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct branches: claim preclusion and
issue preclusion." Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 221 P.3d 194, 203 (Utah
2009. "Claim preclusion is premised on the principle that a controversy should be
adjudicated only once." Id. (internal quotations and references omitted).
It is claim preclusion that applies to the instant motion. In u ta whether a claim
or assertion is precluded from re-litigation depends on a three-part test. IdL As set forth in
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Mack, 221 P.3d at 203, this three-part test, is as follows:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second,
the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the
first suit or be one that could and should have been raised in the first
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits.
As discussed below, each part of the three-part test is present in the instant action.
Accordingly, Investors' attempts to prove claims against HomeNet are barred.
/.

Both the bankruptcy case and the instant case involve the same parties or their
privies.
The first prong is easily met. Investors and HomeNet were involved as parties in

the bankruptcy case. Investors and HomeNet are also involved in the instant action as
Investors seek to prove that HomeNet is liable to Investors for securities fraud. (See
Investors' Third Amended Complaint.)
//.

Investors' claims against HomeNet could have been raised in the bankruptcy
action.
With regards to the second prong of the test for claim preclusion, the Utah

Supreme Court stated that, "[cjlaims or causes of action are the same as those brought or
that could have been brought in the first action if they arise from the same operative facts,
or in other words from the same transaction." Mack, 221 P.3d at 203 (referencing
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982).
In Mack, the Utah Division of Securities sought to obtain sanctions against Mack
through an administrative action. IcL at 197-98. However, prior to pursuing the
administrative action, the Division filed an action in district court, which action was then
dismissed. IcL The trial court did allow the Division an opportunity to file an amended
19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

complaint within thirty days of the dismissal, if such amendments remedied the defects in
the initial complaint. I d However, the Division elected not to file an amended complaint,
but pursued an administrative action instead. Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that
because the transaction complained of in the administrative action was the same as the
transaction addressed in the court action, and because of the Division's decision not to
file an amended complaint, claim preclusion barred the Division from pursing the same
claims against Mack in another forum. I d at 203-05. Accordingly, the trial court's
decision to grant a permanent injunction against the Division was affirmed, halting any
further administrative action against Mack. I d at 205.
In the instant matter, as with the Division of Securities in Mack, Investors had
every opportunity to present their claims for securities fraud against HomeNet to the
bankruptcy court, but they elected not to do so. Investors were aware of the bankruptcy
case and actually participated in that action. Specifically, in the bankruptcy case,
Investors raised claims based upon the same loan transaction complained of here. Indeed,
the only reason Investors participated and were involved in the bankruptcy case was
because of the underlying transaction Investors now complain of here. A claim of fraud
against HomeNet based upon the transaction Investors complain of now would have been
directly relevant to the bankruptcy case and should have been raised in that forum.
Investors' refusal to assert a claim against HomeNet while HomeNet was in bankruptcy
should not be rewarded by allowing Investors to now assert the same overdue claim
against HomeNet, especially when HomeNet is not a named party in the instant action
and is not present to defend itself. Indeed, a main objective of the doctrine of res judicata
20
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is to prevent inequities such as the one Investors promote here.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that Investors could have filed
their claims against HomeNet in the bankruptcy case, but willfully elected not to do so.
Accordingly, the Court should find that the second prong of claim preclusion is also met.
Hi.

The bankruptcy case has resulted in a final order.

On April 21, 2008, the bankruptcy court entered an order closing HomeNet's
bankruptcy case and eliminating all existing claims against HomeNet. This order resolved
all existing claims against HomeNet, with particular application to the claims listed in the
Schedules filed with the bankruptcy court. Additionally, the bankruptcy court gave
specific notices regarding the deadline for filing any claims against HomeNet not listed.
Investors did not file an adversarial proceeding against HomeNet, nor did Investors file
any other objections or claims. Accordingly, the final order of the bankruptcy court
constitutes a final order and judgment that eliminates any and all claims against HomeNet
that could have been raised, but were not.
As discussed above, all three prongs of the test for claim preclusion are met.
Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata, or more specifically, claim preclusion, bars
Investors from presenting evidence or argument regarding the liability of HomeNet in the
instant action.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should overturn the trial court's default
judgment against a Party who was present and ready to proceed with trial. This Court
should also issue an order granting judgment on behalf of Ryan.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /£_ day of August, 2011.
AVERY BURDSAL & FALE, PC

J. Fale
Attorney for Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Hutch U. Fale, certify that on this /j?_ day of August, 2011,1 served two copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant upon counsel for the Appellees in this matter by
mailing such copies via first class US mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Keith W. Meade
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, PC
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
AVERY BURDSAL & FALE, PC
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iey for Appellees
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RODARIC GROUP, LLC, ACTION
INVESTMENT SERVICES, LLC, LEE
JACKSON, and RICHARD JACKSON,

JUDGMENT
(W. KELLY RYAN)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 070402054
FRANK J. GILLEN, W. KELLY RYAN,
SHAUNA BADGER, and MICHAEL W.
DEVINE,

Judge Steven L. Hansen

Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on Monday, November 8, 2010 at 8:30 a.m. The plaintiff was
represented by counsel, Keith W. Meade and Bradley M. Strassberg of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal.
P.C. The defendant Frank Gillen was present, pro se. Curt Wenger appeared on behalf of Michael
W. Devine. Nate Burdsal of Fale, Burdsal and Avery, P.C. appeared with Shauna Badger.
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The parties stated to the court at the end of morning of November 8, 2010, that a tentative
settlement had been reached, and requested an adjournment until 1:30 p.m. on November 9, 2010,
at which time the trial would commence if settlement was not completed.
The plaintiffs and the defendants Gillen, Badger and Devine have reached settlements, and
appropriate orders have been entered. The sole remaining defendant is W. Kelly Ryan. Mr. Ryan
did not appear either on November 8 or November 9, 2010. He was present in the court when the
trial was originally scheduled on August 2, 2010, and was then advised of the new trial date, to
which he agreed.
Based on Ryaivs failure to appear for triaf,-his answer is stricken and his default is entered.
Based upon the documents submitted and received into evidence, including in particular
Exhibits 8 (a form 13 D filed by Mr. Ryan showing that he was principally employed as an officer
of the borrower, HomeNet Communications), 24, 73, 74, 79, 81, and 92, the court finds that Mr.
Ryan was an officer and a director of HomeNet Communications in October, 2004.
In addition, the plaintiffs proffered their testimony regarding the significance of the
involvement of Harrison Horn as the collateral agent in connection with their October, 2004 loans
of $250,000 (Action Investments, LLC) and $200,000 (Rodaric Investments, LLC) to HomeNet
Communications, Inc. (the "October loans") made while Ryan was an officer and director of the
company. It was also proffered that Harrison Horn would testify that he never agreed to be a
collateral agent, and that he was never even approached to be a collateral agent.
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Based upon the non-appearance of Ryan, and his failure to demonstrate that he did not know
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the facts by reason of which the
liability is alleged to exist,
JUDGMENT is hereby entered against W. Kelly Ryan and in favor of Action Investments
in the amount of $250,000.00, plus interest at 12% from October 13, 2004, until paid; and
against W. Kelly Ryan and in favor of Rodaric Investments, LLC in the amount of $200,000.00 plus
interest at 12 % per annum from October 13, 2004; plus in favor of both plaintiffs and against Mr.
Ryan, all attorneys fees reasonably incurred both prior to judgment, and in the collection of the

(in
judgment, all as allowed by UCA § 6 1 - 1 - 2 2 ^ 0 ,
DATED thi s

yc

ftk

/ dcav of November, 2010.
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT
(VV. KELLY RYAN) was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the ^J_

day of November, 2010, to

the following:
Nathan E. Burdsal
AVERY BURDSAL & FALE PC
1422 East 820 North
Orem, UT 84097

Curtis L. Wenger, Esq.
30 East Broadway, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

.

W. Kelly Ryan, Pro Se
135 Basin Street SVV
Ephrata, WA 98823
Frank J. Gillen, Pro Se
2807 Allen Street, #708
Dallas, TX 75204
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